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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent changes to statutory antidiscrimination law raise
questions about the current and optimal role of privacy in
employment discrimination jurisprudence. The recently amended
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 and recently passed Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)2 both provide
employment protections that are allied with privacy in some
instances and at tension in others. Framed another way, one might
question whether privacy is a civil right or civil want in the context of
employment discrimination law. This Essay argues that in the
statutory areas of the ADA and GINA, foregoing privacy is sometimes
desirable in order to fight subordination by employees revealing, and
employers considering, particular health traits and information.
II. THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT
GINA illustrates how the values of privacy and
antidiscrimination may be allies. In 2008, Congress passed GINA,
making it illegal to discriminate against applicants, employees,
and former employees on the basis of genetic information.3 GINA
includes a prohibition on the use of genetic information in all
employment decisions,4 strict limits on the ability of employers
and other covered entities to request or to acquire genetic
information,5 and requirements to maintain the confidentiality of
any genetic information acquired.6 Genetic information includes
information about an individual’s genetic tests and the genetic
tests of an individual’s family members, as well as information
about any disease, disorder, or condition of an individual’s family
members.7 Notably, GINA generally forbids both an employer’s
1 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2006)).
2 Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and
42 U.S.C.).
3 Id. § 202.
4 Id. § 202(a).
5 See id. § 202(b) (noting six exceptions to the general prohibition against requesting or
acquiring genetic information).
6 Id. § 206.
7 Id. § 201(4).
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acquisition and use of genetic information, requiring a “genomeblind” approach to protecting genetic information.8
GINA is both similar to and different from previous
antidiscrimination statutes.
While the language of GINA’s
employment provisions tracks the language of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 fairly closely,9 the nature of its protections
differ in that they are more forward-looking and less responsive to
serious social harms. After all, only a few cases of genetic
discrimination have been documented.10 In contrast, Title VII was
retrospective, legislated in response to a history of widespread
racism and civil unrest.11 Additionally, whereas the purpose of
previous antidiscrimination statutes was to protect identifiable
social groups, individuals with genetic predispositions constitute
no visible underclass.12 Given that every individual carries some
genetic traits that render them vulnerable to illness or disease,
GINA’s “protected class” is necessarily indeterminate.13 GINA
was, therefore, legislated not to counteract systemic disadvantage

8 Jessica
L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an
Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 622 (2011) (citing Mark A. Rothstein,
Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW & INEQ. 429, 456 (2007)).
9 See Pauline T. Kim, Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectives from the
U.S. Experience, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 693, 697 (2010) (explaining how GINA’s
operative language parallels Title VII’s main provisions). For the statutory text of Title VII,
see Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255–57 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (2006)) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin).
10 Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 441 (2010) (noting that GINA is “the first
preemptive antidiscrimination statute in American history”). There have, however, been
some incidents of nonconsensual genetic testing over the last decade. See, e.g., Jeffrey S.
Morrow, Note, Insuring Fairness: The Popular Creation of Genetic Antidiscrimination, 98
GEO. L.J. 215, 245 (2009) (discussing one company’s efforts to test workers for a
predisposition to carpal tunnel syndrome as a way to avoid disability payments to workers
who developed the condition).
11 Kim, supra note 9, at 697–98; Roberts, supra note 8, at 625 (stating that Title VII and
the ADA retrospectively looked “to existing discrimination to justify protecting against
future harm”).
12 Kim, supra note 9, at 698 (“Genetic discrimination is not an ongoing and widespread
social practice that has produced a visible underclass.”).
13 Id. (noting that it is difficult to identify who is in the “protected class”).
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or inequality but to prevent genetic discrimination and promote
the use of genetic technologies.14
III. THE ANTICLASSIFICATION TURN
I have recently argued that GINA, in concert with a few other
developments in employment discrimination law, represents a
noteworthy and anticlassificationist departure from previous
employment discrimination statutes, which have historically been
oriented around antisubordination.15
The antisubordination/
anticlassification framework has been invoked widely both to
describe and advocate for certain readings of antidiscrimination
law.16
The antisubordination principle generally prohibits
practices that “enforce the inferior social status of historically
oppressed groups” and allows practices that challenge historical
oppression.17 In contrast, anticlassification principles prohibit
practices that “classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on
the basis of a forbidden category.”18
Adopting a purely
anticlassificationist viewpoint would mean never making use of a
forbidden trait (such as race), while an antisubordinationist
14 Id. (“[U]nlike traditional civil rights legislation, the purpose of GINA is . . . to prevent
prospectively the emergence of genetic discrimination . . . to promote the use of genetic
technologies.”).
15 See Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination
Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
m?abstract_id=1887772 (arguing that recent changes to the ADA, Title VII, and the
enactment of GINA may imperil the underlying normative foundation of employment
discrimination law by turning toward and emphasizing anticlassification values at the
expense of employment discrimination’s antisubordinationist foundation).
16 See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness”
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 78 (2000)
(noting that this distinction “has dominated arguments about equality in popular, academic,
and judicial fora” for over two decades).
17 Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004); see Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976) (arguing
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws or official practices that
“aggravate[ ] . . . the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group”); Barbara J.
Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 935,
960 (1994) (“[T]he antisubordination principle contends that certain groups should not
occupy socially, culturally, or materially subordinate positions in society.”).
18 Jack
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003).
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orientation would allow consideration of the classification as long
as it serves antisubordination goals.
Title VII, the ADA, and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)19 each illustrate how employment discrimination law
has, as a whole, been antisubordination-oriented.20 Even though
certain provisions of the statutes are facially anticlassificationist,
these laws prize antisubordination values, in that they are
designed to respond to a history of discrimination and incorporate
many provisions that expressly take account of forbidden traits—
through doctrines such as disparate impact and reasonable
accommodation and the policy of affirmative action.21
GINA stands in contrast to this historical orientation by
representing a turn toward anticlassification principles (and a
possible turn away from antisubordination norms). There are several
reasons why. Beyond its textual anticlassificationist requirement
that employers not classify on the basis of genetic information,22
GINA only proscribes disparate treatment, or intentional
discrimination.23 Indeed, the text expressly provides that no cause of
action exists for practices that have a disparate impact.24 This cause
of action is available under Title VII,25 the ADEA,26 and the ADA,27
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634).
See Areheart, supra note 15, at 11–19 (explaining how each statute, and employment
discrimination jurisprudence as a whole, has been oriented around antisubordination values).
21 See id. at 14–15 (noting that while “the disparate treatment provisions . . . are on face
anticlassificationist,” the laws primarily advance antisubordination values).
22 GINA, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202(a), 122 Stat. 881, 907 (2008) (making it unlawful for
an employer to discriminate because of genetic information).
23 Id. § 202(a)(1).
24 Id. § 208(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, ‘disparate impact’, as
that term is used in section 703(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)), on
the basis of genetic information does not establish a cause of action under this Act.”). This
provision may stem from the fact that GINA was not passed to protect any particular
subordinated group.
25 Title VII expressly prohibits employers from using any “particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin” unless the practice is both job-related and consistent with business necessity. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
26 See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 233–40 (2005) (interpreting 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) of the ADEA—in light of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
and its consideration of identical text—to cover disparate impact claims).
27 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (6) (2006) (noting the phrase “discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability” includes neutral policies and practices “that have the
effect of discrimination on the basis of disability”).
19
20
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and takes into account the demographic results of facially neutral
policies and practices in the workplace to help uncover covert
discrimination. GINA also does not allow the strategic consideration
of genetic information to counter future genetic subordination.28 For
example, no provision addresses reasonable accommodation—despite
the fact such a provision could have been easily integrated into the
statute to achieve antisubordination goals. Nor does the statute
allow any positive consideration of genetic information through
programs like genetic diversity initiatives. In whole, various key
provisions and omissions indicate GINA is largely an
anticlassificationist statute.29
GINA may also represent a possible trend in employment
discrimination toward privacy.
Indeed, anticlassification
principles are a natural ally to privacy. If consideration of a trait
is forbidden, there is no need to disclose information pertaining to
the trait, and thus we can afford strong privacy rights to
individuals possessing the trait. In this way, GINA’s passage
helps ensure privacy rights for genetic information by generally
prohibiting employers from considering the “forbidden trait” of
genetic information.
IV. ANTISUBORDINATION AND PRIVACY
But are the privacy rights afforded by GINA optimal? A
natural tension exists between maintaining privacy and
effectuating the antidiscrimination mandate in the employment
context.
In particular, the antisubordination principle of
considering certain traits to further antisubordination ends may
advance antidiscrimination’s goals but chafe privacy.
For
30
reasonable
example, doctrines such as disparate impact,
28 See generally Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (declaring legislative findings and outlining the scope of the Act).
29 See Roberts, supra note 8, at 634 (“Because GINA provides individualized protection,
prohibits any consideration of genetic information—positive or negative—and only outlaws
intentional discrimination, the statute currently favors anticlassification.”). GINA is
“largely” an anticlassificationist statute. Even though the legislative findings reference
eugenics and forced sterilization laws (examples of historical genetic subordination), the
statute is substantially directed toward anticlassification norms, and there is no indication
that any genetic subordination is ongoing.
30 See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
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accommodation,31 and affirmative action32 require us to consider
and make use of information about employees’ identity traits. If
an employer does not have knowledge of an employee’s disability
or religion, the employer cannot provide a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA or Title VII, respectively.
Likewise, an employer cannot gauge whether a policy or test has a
disparate impact if unaware of the identity traits of the
individuals who take such a test or are affected by a particular
policy.
In short, various antisubordination policies require
employers to know of particular identity traits to enable them to
compensate for a potentially inequitable practice or state of affairs.
This tension between antisubordination and privacy has
particular salience in the antidiscrimination areas of disability
and genetics since the underlying information of these
characteristics is often not readily discernible. In contrast, an
employer is much more likely to be intuitively (or otherwise) aware
of an employee’s race, age, or sex. Privacy thus holds less promise
under a statute like Title VII or the ADEA—and has more
potential value under statutes like the ADA or GINA. Given the
tension between antisubordination and privacy in the areas of
disability and genetics, should we prioritize privacy or
antisubordination?
In the context of GINA, it may be desirable to take account of
and use genetic information for antisubordination purposes, much
like the ADA allows such use of disability-related information. In
particular, the ADA allows employers to consider health-related
information
when
determining
whether
a
requested
accommodation will be effective and whether their employment
practices have a disparate impact on people with disabilities.33
Under GINA, reserving the ability to use genetic information to
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006).
Title VII permits properly tailored “affirmative action plan[s] voluntarily adopted by
private parties to eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation.” United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
641–42 (1987) (extending Weber to gender-based affirmative action). Title VII also
expressly allows for court-ordered affirmative action to remediate past discrimination. In
particular, Title VII permits courts, upon finding that an employer is engaging in an
unlawful employment practice, to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).
33 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)–(6) (2006).
31
32
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fight future subordination may similarly be optimal. As we learn
more about genetic information and such knowledge becomes
widespread, requiring employers to consider genetic information
for the discrete purposes of providing reasonable accommodation,
gauging disparate impact discrimination, and promoting
initiatives that affirm genetic diversity may be helpful.
The ADA requires an employer to provide reasonable
accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities who are
employees or applicants for employment, unless doing so would
cause undue hardship.34 Under the ADA, an accommodation
includes any change in the work environment or in the way things
are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability
to enjoy equal employment opportunities.35
In the genetic context, consider Professor Jessica Roberts’s
example of a person with a genetic predisposition to develop carpal
tunnel syndrome.36 GINA employs an anticlassificationist scheme
that, unlike the ADA, bars an employer from considering such
genetic information and classifying on that basis.37 However, if an
employer could consider genetic information, she might be able to
provide an accommodation for the person genetically predisposed
to carpal tunnel (such as working longer hours with more frequent
breaks or switching positions throughout the day) that would
prevent or slow the onset of this particular condition.38 Besides
the obvious benefits to the employee, the employer could avoid
possible “work-related injury and any resulting gaps in
employment.”39
As previously noted, other antidiscrimination statutes, such as
Title VII and the ADA, allow claimants to challenge facially
34 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (noting the phrase “discriminate against a qualified individual on
the basis of disability” includes an unwillingness to make reasonable accommodations,
unless such an accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the operation of the
business).
35 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2011).
36 Roberts, supra note 8, at 639.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. Knowledge of a condition like carpal tunnel could, however, also lead an employer
to discriminate. See Morrow, supra note 10, at 245 (describing an employer’s attempts to
avoid disability payments). However, disclosing one’s impairment to secure a reasonable
accommodation involves a level of risk/reward tolerated under the ADA.
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neutral policies that create discriminatory results even where no
intent to discriminate exists.40 This type of claim is referred to as
a “disparate impact” cause of action. An employer, in response,
must show that the policy or requirement that creates the
disparate impact is both job-related and a business necessity—or
face liability for unlawful discrimination.41
In the genetic context, the risk of disparate impact
discrimination stems from the fact that as scientists discover
genes associated with certain illnesses and corresponding
identifiable traits, individuals with such identifiable traits could
potentially be screened out. For example, Roberts notes that
scientists have discovered that a gene associated with height is
linked to a genetic variant that predisposes its carriers to heart
disease.42 Accordingly, an employer might well decide to impose
height requirements as a pretext for discriminating on the basis of
the genetic predisposition to develop heart disease.43
The specter of disparate impact genetic discrimination is akin
to statistical discrimination, where employers use race or gender
proxies that correlate with a fact employers may validly consider—
such as criminal convictions, financial distress, or lack of
citizenry.44 If employers discover that a nonproscribed trait, such
as height, is statistically tied to severe illness, they could engage
in disparate impact genetic discrimination.45 A disparate impact
cause of action would thus provide employees with a useful tool to
ferret out genetic discrimination, especially since intentional
discrimination is notoriously difficult to prove.46 Accordingly, one

40 See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (prohibiting practices that
“cause[ ] a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”);
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (2006) (prohibiting practices “that have the effect of
discrimination on the basis of disability”).
41 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
42 Roberts, supra note 8, at 640.
43 Id. Requiring the employer, though, to show both that the requirement is job-related
and that it is a business necessity would likely uncover the discrimination.
44 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 363 (2008) (arguing that increasing the availability of information about individuals
can reduce statistical discrimination).
45 Roberts, supra note 8, at 640.
46 See Ross v. Runyon, 859 F. Supp. 15, 21–22 (D.D.C. 1994) (acknowledging “that
discriminatory intent and proof of disparate treatment are notoriously difficult to establish”).
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possible way to prevent a genetic underclass is to supplement the
existing disparate treatment scheme with disparate impact
protection now.47
Finally, genetic diversity initiatives could, in the future, prove
useful for the same reason that they have been common for other
antidiscrimination categories in work and education.48 While we
may be unable to predict who will incur stigma due to their genetic
status, “we know enough about social subjugation in other contexts
to take preventative measures.”49 Celebrating genetic diversity
and its fundamentality to human existence might help “prevent
negative stereotypes based on genetic difference from forming.”50
Such recommendations are commensurate with, and would
represent an incremental extension of, the ADA’s current
approach.
The ADA provides the right to reasonable
accommodation and a disparate impact cause of action and allows
an employer to use disability-related information for “positive”
purposes such as diversity initiatives.
GINA’s genetic
51
exceptionalism —or treating genetic information separately and
differently from other health information—is without strong
justification.
V. DISCLOSING GENETIC INFORMATION
Disclosure of private information may be preferable to silent
subordination. The best example of this is found in the ADA’s
doctrine of reasonable accommodation. A disabled employee whose
illness or condition is exacerbated by current working conditions
47 Disparate impact protection may seem unnecessary since genetic knowledge is young
and evidence of disparate treatment is thus far scant. Indeed, such an inference is
supported by Congress’s notation to revisit in 2014 whether GINA ought to support a
disparate impact cause of action. GINA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-7 (Supp. II 2009) (“On the date
that is [six] years after May 21, 2008, there shall be established a commission, to be known
as the Genetic Nondiscrimination Study Commission . . . to review the developing science of
genetics and to make recommendations to Congress regarding whether to provide a
disparate impact cause of action under this Act.”).
48 Roberts, supra note 8, at 632.
49 Id. at 631.
50 Id. at 632.
51 See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, 29 AM.
J.L. & MED. 77, 83 n.28 (2003) (defining genetic exceptionalism); Mark A. Rothstein, Is
GINA Worth the Wait?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 177 (2008) (same).
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has two choices: to stay quiet about her disability (and, thus,
preserve privacy if her employer has no knowledge of the
condition) or to voluntarily approach the employer, disclose the
condition, and suggest a reasonable accommodation that would
allow her to remain able to perform the essential functions of the
job. In such a situation a tension exists between privacy and the
need to ameliorate one’s subordinating situation. Yet, the ADA’s
emphasis on reasonable accommodation implies that selfdisclosure of one’s disability is worth the loss of privacy. There is
no obvious reason why we ought to treat genetic information
differently—even though the information pertains to a health
condition that has not yet manifested itself. GINA, in this context,
has both the potential to fight genetic discrimination and to
prevent some disabilities.52
GINA should encourage the voluntary self-disclosure of genetic
conditions under certain circumstances.53 As with the ADA, people
should be able to choose to disclose their health-related (genetic)
information—permitting
an
employer
to
consider
that
information—when it would benefit them.54 Requiring employers
to consider voluntarily-disclosed genetic information in certain
contexts would allow individuals to benefit from genetic testing
and not fear discrimination.55 For example, providing the right to
a genetic-based reasonable accommodation would encourage
applicants and employees to undergo genetic testing and think
carefully about what they can do to protect their future health—
which may well include seeking a reasonable accommodation.
Additionally, encouraging openness about genetic information
may spur solidarity among those who are predisposed to dire
physical conditions. This point ties into the earlier suggestion

52 For example, if the person with a genetic predisposition to carpal tunnel secures a
reasonable accommodation, she might never develop carpal tunnel.
53 This Essay is not advocating making all genetic information public. Many of GINA’s
anticlassificationist protections are important, such as strict limits on requesting or
acquiring genetic information and the requirement to maintain the confidentiality of any
genetic information acquired.
54 Roberts, supra note 8, at 646.
55 Id.
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Keeping genetic
regarding genetic diversity initiatives.56
information private could lead those who have certain “negative”
genes to feel stigmatized and cause the public to underappreciate
the commonality of having a predisposition to one or more
debilitating conditions. Much like it is important for people to
realize that disability exists on a continuum and that we will all be
disabled if we live long enough, the public must understand that
everyone has genes—some good and some bad—and society must
insist on nondiscrimination for all.
One might question whether GINA should facilitate disclosure
of genetic information for antisubordination ends at a time when
genetic discrimination is not yet common. This same question
might be asked of the statute generally: Why provide protection
from genetic discrimination before it is widespread? One answer
is found in GINA’s legislative findings. Given this country’s
history of eugenic-based immigration and sterilization laws in the
1920s and the influx of mandatory testing for sickle cell anemia in
the 1970s—and given that knowledge of genetics is rapidly
expanding—being preemptive instead of reactionary makes
sense.57
A second answer is that laws have symbolic value, which
transcends any immediate practical consequences.58 In particular,
antidiscrimination laws have an expressive function, which has
historically, and gradually, helped change private parties’ attitudes
about particular identity traits.59 In the expressive context, GINA’s
enactment signals both a particular valuation of genetic information
as well as a general emphasis on protecting immutable traits as

56 See id. at 639 (“Additionally, allowing employers to consider genetic information leaves
the door open for genetic diversity initiatives that would teach us to value genetic difference
early in the creation of this new antidiscrimination category.”).
57 See generally GINA, Pub. L. No. 101-233 § 2, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (outlining history of
genetic-related discrimination in the United States).
58 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2045 (1996) (“My basic proposition is that, at least for purposes of law, any support for
‘statements’ should be rooted not simply in the intrinsic value of the statement, but also in
plausible judgments about its effect on social norms and hence in ‘on balance’ judgments
about its consequences.” (footnote omitted)).
59 Rothstein, supra note 51, at 177.
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part of the antidiscrimination project.60 Accordingly, augmenting
the statute to give greater protections—even at the expense of
privacy—has both future instrumental value and current expressive
value.
If the political will exists to secure “negative” (or
anticlassificationist) rights for genetic information, why not also
now provide “positive” (or antisubordination-based) rights?
One might also question whether permitting the use of genetic
information for the specified purposes is too injurious to privacy.
While this short Essay is only intended to be exploratory and
cannot possibly weigh the competing normative considerations
that inhere in privacy and antisubordination, it is worth noting
that a handful of de jure exceptions already exist that allow an
employer to legally discover genetic information, such as when a
company includes genetic tests in a company-sponsored wellness
program61 or genetically monitors the biological effects of toxic
substances in the workplace.62 Such exceptions suggest that any
genetic privacy secured through GINA was not intended to be
absolute, but instead, balanced against other considerations.
The most notable exception to GINA’s proscription of employer
acquisition of genetic information, however, is a de facto one.
Under the ADA, employers may lawfully require individuals to
release all of their health records once a conditional offer of
employment has been made.63 The purpose of this provision is to
allow the employer to ensure the individual can perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation. If the records were to indicate that the individual
is likely to be unable to perform the essential functions of the job,
the offer could be withdrawn.64 Even if an employer were to
request only nongenetic health information, it is commonplace for

60 See generally Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483 (2011) (considering immutability as a
unifying principle for employment discrimination law).
61 GINA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (Supp. II 2009).
62 Id. § 2000ff-5.
63 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2006).
64 See id. § 12112(a) (providing employment discrimination protection for disabled
applicants or employees who are “qualified”); § 12111(8) (requiring a “qualified individual”
to be able to “perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires”).
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custodians to release all of an individual’s health records.65 Any
injury to privacy furthered by this Essay’s recommendations would
thus only be incremental. Moreover, the recommendations herein
contemplate only voluntary disclosure. An employer could not
compel the information that would, for example, constitute the
basis for a reasonable accommodation.
VI. CONCLUSION
GINA currently employs a pure anticlassificationist scheme
that grants employees strong privacy rights by prohibiting any
employer consideration of genetic information. However, adding
certain antisubordinationist provisions, which would require
employer consideration of self-disclosed genetic information, would
strengthen GINA’s current framework. Under both GINA and the
ADA, foregoing privacy to fight subordination is in many instances
desirable. Privacy may thus be a civil want—rather than a civil
right—in the area of health traits that receive protection from
employment discrimination.

65 See Rothstein, supra note 51, at 177 (noting lack of practical way to filter out nongenetic information).

